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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1992).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED AND THE
STANDARD HF APPffT.T.ATE REVIEW
(1)

Whether the trial court erred in adding Salt Lake

City Corporation, a non-party to the action, to the Special
Verdict Form for purposes of allowing the jury to apportion
the City's fault under Utah's comparative negligence
statute.

The trial court's statutory interpretation

presents a question of law that is accorded no particular
deference and is reviewed for correctness. Asay v. Watkins,
751 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1988) .
(2) Whether the Plaintiff was prejudiced by the trial
court's refusal to allow Plaintiff to call a proper rebuttal
witness at trial.

The trial court's rulings on the

admission or exclusion of evidence are reviewed for abuse of
discretion. State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879 (Utah 1988).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
1.

Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-37 - 78-27-41 (1992):

78-27-37.

Definitions.

As used in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-43:
(1) "Defendant means any person not immune from suit
who is claimed to be liable because of fault to any
person seeking recovery.
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of legal
duty, act or omission proximately causing or
contributing to injury or damages sustained by a person
seeking recovery, including, but not limited to,
negligence in all its degrees, contributory negligence,
assumption of risk, strict liability, breach of express
or implied warranty of a product, products liability,
and misuse, modification or abuse of a product.
(3) "Person seeking recovery" means any person
seeking damages or reimbursement on its own behalf, or

on behalf of another for whom it is authorized to act
as legal representative.
78-27-38.

Comparative negligence.

The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone
bar recovery by that person. He may recover from any
defendant or group of defendants whose fault exceeds
his own. However, no defendant is liable to any person
seeking recovery for any amount in excess of the
proportion of fault attributable that defendant.
78-27-39. Separate special verdicts on total damages
and proportion of fault.
The trial court may, and when requested by any party
shall, direct the jury, if any, to find separate
special verdicts determining the total amount of
damages sustained and the percentage or proportion of
fault attributable to each person seeking recovery and
to each defendant.
78-27-40. Amount of liability limited to proportion of
fault—No contribution.
Subject to Section 78-27-38, the maximum amount for
which a defendant may be liable to any person seeking
recovery is that percentage or proportion of the
damages equivalent to the percentage or proportion of
fault attributed to that defendant. No defendant is
entitled to contribution from any other person.
78-27-41.

Joinder of defendants.

A person seeking recovery, or any defendant who is a
party to the litigation, may join as parties any
defendants who may have caused or contributed to the
injury or damages for which recovery is sought, for the
purpose of having determined their respective
proportions of fault.
gTATKMKNT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

Plaintiff/Appellant Julie Anderson Turner ("Turner")
sued Defendant/Appellee Amy Nelson ("Nelson") in March,
1991, alleging negligence for injuries she received July 6,
1989 when Nelson ran a stop sign and collided with Turner's car.
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B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below

Nelson answered Turner's complaint on April 12, 1991
and denied that she was negligent, and further alleged that
Turner's injuries were caused by the negligence of third
parties.

Discovery ensued.

At her deposition July 2, 1991,

Nelson testified that the stop sign she ran was "partially
covered" by trees.

She confessed, however, that her memory

was a bit vague concerning the facts surrounding the
collision.
Discovery was concluded by court order on February 20,
1992 and trial was set for March 3, 1992. On February 26,
1992, Nelson asked the trial court to add Salt Lake City to
the special verdict form for the purpose of having the jury
consider and apportion a non-party's (Salt Lake City)
alleged fault for Turner's injuries.

On the morning of the

first day of trial the court granted Nelson's motion.
jury found no fault

The

on the part of Nelson, and judgment was

entered against Turner.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 6, 1989, Turner was driving westbound on Third
Avenue near its intersection with Canyon Road in Salt Lake
City. (R. 3). Nelson had just dropped her boyfriend off at
the airport and was headed up Canyon Road to look at houses
before going to work. (R. 324-26).

Nelson had never been on

Canyon Road before. (R. 325).
Nelson proceeded north on Canyon Road. (R. 326). She
failed to heed the "Stop Ahead" warning sign on the road (R.
-3-

326), and then ran the stop sign at the corner of Canyon
Road and Third Avenue.

Nelson hit Turner's car in the front

left quarter panel.
Salt Lake City Police Officer Mickey Paul was the first
officer to arrive at the scene of the accident. (R. 432).
Officer Paul neither observed nor noted any obstruction of
the stop sign at that intersection. (R. 434). No indication
of any obstruction appeared on the official report filed by
the investigating officer. (R. 397). Neither Nelson nor
Daniel Rusk, an eyewitness, ever told the investigating
officer that the stop sign was obstructed. (R. 329, 645).
Turner's complaint was served on Nelson March 27, 1991.
(R. 6-8). Nelson answered the complaint on April 12, 1991,
and denied any negligence (R. 9-13). Nelson claimed that
Turner was contributorily negligent, and further alleged
that Turner's injuries were caused by the negligence of
unspecified third parties. Id.
Discovery commenced and on July 2, 1991, Nelson was
deposed. (R. 16). During her deposition, Nelson claimed
that the stop sign had been ''partially obstructed," but
testified that she had seen the stop sign prior to entering
the intersection and hitting Turner's car. (R. 331-32).
On December 12, 1991, the trial court issued a
scheduling order setting February 20, 1992 as the discovery
cutoff and March 3, 1992 as the trial date. (R. 68). On
February 26, 1992, Nelson filed a "Motion for Apportionment
of Fault of Salt Lake City" and accompanying brief. (R. 100-4-

101; 112-18).

Nelson sought a hearing on her Motion the

morning of the first day of trial. (R. 119). Turner filed
an objection to the motion. (R. 135-38).

The trial court

granted the motion without argument. (R. 357-58).
After the court granted Nelson's Motion, trial began.
In his opening statement, Nelson's counsel began his attack
on the City in

absentia:

I think the real fault here that — we're suggesting is
with Salt Lake City. It's a bad design. They didn't
have it well signed.
(R. 376).
That evening, Turner's counsel set out to find a
witness to rebut Nelson's attack upon the non-party City.
Counsel discovered Mr. Jim Nakling, a resident of the Canyon
Road/Third Avenue area for 10 years.

Mr. Nakling was

prepared to testify that he had walked his dog by that
intersection, twice daily, and that the stop sign was not
obstructed by trees or foliage at the time of the accident,
nor at any time since. (R. 148).
The morning of the second day of trial, counsel filed a
motion seeking permission to call Mr. Nakling at trial. (R.
143-45).

The motion was accompanied by the affidavit of

counsel and relevant case law supporting the motion. (R.
146-48, 150-60).
On the third day of trial, counsel called Mr. Nakling
as a rebuttal witness.

The court refused to allow the

rebuttal evidence. (R. 744). Counsel then proffered Mr.
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Nakling's testimony, arguing that the testimony was proper
rebuttal and was critical to the fair presentation of the
case to the jury.

Counsel also sought a continuance of the

trial in order to allow Nelson to depose Nakling if she
desired. (R. 745). The court denied the request, and
refused to allow the rebuttal evidence. Id.
Nelson's primary attack in her closing argument was
upon the absent City for causing the accident. (R. 775).
The jury returned a verdict of no negligence

on the part of

Nelson, from which Turner appeals. (R. 792).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-41
mandates that a defendant

be joined as a party

before her

negligence can be considered by the trier of fact.

The

policy considerations underlying the Act and the
Legislature's statutory scheme support this interpretation.

I would like to proffer a Mr. Jim Nakling—and I found his
name is spelled N-a-k-1-i-n-g, and he resides at 122 North
Canyon Road, one house away from the stop sign, and his
testimony is that for the past 10 years he has walked his
dogs past that stop sign two times per day on a usual day
and he has never seen any obstruction of that stop sign.
The tree to which it is alleged obstructed of the stop sign
has never been cut. The tree in front of his house has
never been cut in the past 10 years that he's been there and
furthermore, the stop sign has never been changed and he's
never observed it bent during the past seven or eight years.
He will further testify that the stop ahead sign which is
somewhat in dispute as to when it placed there, he will
testify that that stop ahead sign has been there, as has the
stop sign, since the road was repaired after the floods of
1983, so this is all of the testimony that I think is
essential that this witness would testify about. (R.
746)(emphasis supplied).
-6-

Restricting the apportionment of negligence to

parties

to an action is wholly consistent with, and substantially
furthers, the policies of judicial economy and fairness to
the parties to the litigation.

It encourages the joinder of

all potentially responsible tortfeasors into the initial
litigation, which in turn ensures that no named

defendant

will be liable for more than her share of fault*

It further

prevents multiple and successive litigation by plaintiffs
seeking to bind "ghost" tortfeasors legally for acts for
which a jury finds them theoretically responsible.
Nelson provided no adequate explanation either for
failing to add the City when she uniquely possessed
knowledge of the City's potential negligence, or for her
failure to notify the trial court and Turner of her
intention to add the City to the special verdict form until
six days before trial.

Nelson's motion to add the City,

made less than a week before trial, and the trial court's
addition of the City the day of trial was manifestly unfair
and prejudicial to Turner, and constituted an abuse of the
trial court's discretion•
The rebuttal evidence proffered by Turner at trial was
clearly proper rebuttal evidence calculated to meet new
evidence and the newly added "party" at trial.

Under the

facts and circumstances of the case, the court's denial of
Turner's rebuttal evidence was manifestly unfair and
patently prejudicial, and constituted a clear abuse of
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discretion.

The court's ruling should be reversed, and the

case should be remanded for a new trial.
ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES
I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S ADDITION OF A NON-PARTY TO THE
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR
The court below permitted Salt Lake City Corporation

(the "City"), a non-party to the action, to be added to the
special verdict form the day of trial for the purpose of
apportioning the City's alleged negligence.

The court's

ruling was based upon an erroneous interpretation of Utah's
Liability Reform Act, and was unjust, inequitable and
prejudicial.

The court's ruling should be reversed and

remanded for retrial in accordance with the plain language
of Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-41 and Utah's Liability Reform
Act.
A.

THE STATUTORY SCHEME AND THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF §
78-27-41 PRECLUDES THE APPORTIONMENT OF FAULT TO
NON-PARTIES

This appeal presents a question of first impression in
Utah concerning the proper interpretation of Utah's
Liability Reform Act.

The Utah Legislature passed the

Liability Reform Act (the "Act"), Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-37
- 42, in 1986. The Act eliminated contributory negligence,
joint and several liability and contribution between
tortfeasors, and established a pure comparative negligence
system under which no defendant is liable for more than her
respective share of fault.
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In passing the Act, the Legislature made an express and
deliberate policy decision to place the burden upon the
party seeking to have the negligence of nonparties
considered to join any and all other potentially negligent
tortfeasors as parties

to the

action

in order to have those

tortfeasors' negligence, if any, considered.

The plain

language of the Act, the policy considerations underlying
the statutory scheme chosen by the Utah Legislature and the
statutory scheme itself all reflect the Legislature's
considered decision not to permit the apportionment of
negligence to non-parties to an action.
Restricting the. apportionment of negligence to

parties

is wholly consistent with, and substantially furthers, the
policies of judicial economy and fairness to the parties to
the litigation.

It encourages the joinder of all

potentially responsible tortfeasors into the initial
litigation, which in turn ensures that no named

defendant

will be liable for more than her share of fault.

It further

prevents multiple and successive litigation by plaintiffs
seeking to bind "ghost" tortfeasors legally for acts for
which a jury has found them theoretically responsible.
1.

The Plain Language of the Act

The Act begins by defining the three key terms under
the Act:
recovery."

"defendant," "fault" and "person seeking
It then provides:

The fault of a person seeking recovery
shall not alone
bar recovery by that person. He may recover from any
defendant
or group of defendants
whose fault exceeds
-9-

his own. However, no defendant
is liable to any
seeking
recovery
for any amount in excess of the
proportion of fault attributable that
defendant.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-38 (1992)(emphasis supplied).
Act defines a "defendant"

person

The

as "any person not immune from

suit who is claimed to be liable because of fault to any
person seeking recovery." Id. § 78-27-37. A "person
recovery"

seeking

under the Act is "any person seeking damages or

reimbursement on its own behalf, or on behalf of another for
whom it is authorized to act as legal representative." Id.
Defendant

is thus defined more broadly in the Act than

its customary usage,2 and there is no requirement that
either a defendant

or a person

seeking

recovery

be a

party

to the action.3

A defendant1s

seeking

under the Act is limited to the proportion

recovery

liability to a

person

of the total damages equal to that defendant's
78-27-40.

fault. Id. §

The Act provides for separate special verdicts

determining the amount of damages sustained and the
percentage of fault attributable to each person
recovery

and to each defendant.

seeking

Id. § 78-27-39.

Read together, nothing in these sections appears to
prohibit the consideration of any alleged negligence by nonparties to the action.

Read in conjunction with § 78-27-41,

A defendant is the party against whom relief or recovery is
sought in an action or suit. E.g.,
Black's
Law
Dictionary,
at 377 (5th Ed. 1979).
As a practical matter, however, a person seeking
recovery
under the Act will most often be the party bringing the
action.
-10-

however, it is clear that the Legislature intended that only
the negligence of parties*

to the action be apportioned.

Section 78-27-41 provides:

A person

seeking

recovery,

or any defendant

who is a

party to the litigation, may join as parties
any
defendants
who may have caused or contributed to the
injury or damage for which recovery is sought, for the

purpose of having determined
proportions
of
fault.

their

Id. § 78-27-41 (emphasis supplied).
. . . may join as parties

respective
party

Simplified, "any

any [non-party] defendants

. ..

for the purpose of . . . determining] their respective
proportions of fault." Jd.

The statute clearly and

succinctly requires that a defendant

be joined as a party

her negligence is to be considered.

Had the Legislature

if

intended that non-parties' negligence be considered, it
would simply have omitted any requirement that defendants
joined as parties
considered.

be

in order to have their negligence

The Legislature's language and intent must be

respected by this Court.
In construing a statute, all words are presumed to have
been used advisedly. Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 777 P.2d
428 (Utah 1989).

The terms of a statute should be

interpreted in accordance with their usually accepted
meanings. Savage Industries, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n,
808 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1991).

By adopting into a statute a

A "party" to an action is the person whose name is
designated on the record as plaintiff or defendant.
Black's
Law Dictionary,
at 1010 (5th Ed. 1979).
-11-

E.g.,

word or phrase with a distinct legal meaning, the
legislature is presumed to have intended that the meaning be
applied by the courts in construing the statute. Greenhalgh
v. Payson City, 530 P.2d 799 (Utah 1975).
The Legislature specifically used the term "party"

in

conjunction with the allocation of fault under the Act.

The

reason for the Legislature's choice of that term is clear:
its intent that only parties

be considered when apportioning

negligence under the Act. See Greenhalgh, 530 P.2d 799 (Utah
1975).
The language of § 78-27-41 is plain and unequivocal.
It provides that any party
defendant
parties'

as a party

defendant

may join any other

for the purpose of determining all

proportion of fault.

The Legislature has thus

expressly provided the mechanism for a tortfeasor to ensure,
consistent with the other provisions of the Act, that she
will only be responsible for her share of the plaintiffs
damages•
Any other interpretation of this section renders it
mere surplusage; it clearly does not bestow upon plaintiffs
or defendants any right that they do not already possess
under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Utah R. Civ. P.
13, 14, 17, 19, 20, 22. A contrary interpretation of this
section would also conflict with the requirements of, and
policies behind, Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
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In Kemp v. Murray, 680 P.2d 758 (Utah, 1984), this
Court stated that Rules 17 and 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure exist to protect the same interests:

judicial

economy and fairness to the parties in litigation.

The

Court then articulated the purpose of, and policies behind,
these rules:
The purpose of Rule 19(a), 'which requires the joinder
of indispensable parties as a condition to suit, is to
guard against the entry of judgments which might
prejudice the rights of such parties in their
absence'5 . . . In addition, by requiring joinder of
necessary parties, Rule 19(a) protects the interests of
parties who are present by precluding multiple
litigation and contradictory claims over the same
subject matter as the original litigation.
Id. at 760.
Restricting the apportionment of negligence to

parties

is wholly consistent with, and substantially furthers, these
policies.

It encourages the joinder of all potentially

responsible tortfeasors into the initial litigation, which
in turn ensures that no named defendant
more than her share of fault.

will be liable for

It further prevents multiple

and successive litigation by plaintiffs seeking to bind
"ghost" tortfeasors legally for acts for which a jury finds
them theoretically responsible.

Finally, it assigns the

risk of inaction to the party who properly should bear that
risk.

(citing
Sanpete County Water Conservancy District v. Price
Water Users Ass'n, 652 P.2d 1302, 1306 (Utah 1982)).
-13

A.

The Permissive "May" Does Not Affect
Allocation of the Burden Under the Act*

Nelson argued below that the Legislature's use of the
word "may" in § 78-27-41 implies that joinder of a
under the Act is optional•

defendant

As this Court stated in

Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake City, 575 P-2d 705, 706
(Utah 1978),
There is no universal rule by which directory
provisions may, under all circumstances, be
distinguished from those which are mandatory. The
intention of the legislature, however, should be
controlling and no formalistic rule of grammar or word
form should stand in the way of carrying out the
legislative intent.
it

it

it

it

it

Generally those directions which are not of the essence
of the thing to be done, but which are given with a
view merely to the proper, orderly and prompt conduct
of the business, and by the failure to obey no

prejudice

will

occur to those whose rights

are

protected
by the statute,
are not commonly considered
mandatory. Likewise, if the act is performed but not
in the time or in the precise manner directed by the
statute, the provision will not be considered mandatory

if the purpose of the statute has been
complied with and no substantial
rights
jeopardized.
Id. at 706 (citing

1A Sutherland

Statutory

substantially
have been
Construction

25.03, at 299-300 (4th Ed.))(emphasis added).

§

Section 78-

27-41 clearly requires the joinder of other defendants

"for

the purpose of having determined their respective
proportions of fault."

Because substantial rights of a

person

under the Act are at issue, the word

seeking

recovery

"may" in § 78-27-41 is mandatory to the extent that
defendant

Nelson wishes to have other defendants'

apportioned.

See Kennecott, 575 P.2d at 706.
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negligence

This conclusion is bolstered by the Court's Kennecott
analysis.

Several courts have noted that comparative

negligence statutes were enacted in part to alleviate the
harshness of the contributory negligence rule upon
plaintiffs. See Mills v. Brown, 735 P.2d 603, 605-606 (Ore.
1987); Brown v. Keill, 580 P.2d 867, 874 (Kan. 1978). .
Plaintiffs are thus 'protected' under the statute.

Because

of the very real potential, as demonstrated in this case
below, for prejudice to a plaintiff's rights by the
inclusion of a "ghost" tortfeasor at trial, the Legislature
has required defendants
defendants

to join as parties

all other

whose negligence they wish to be considered at

trial.
Moreover, even assuming, arguendo, that Nelson's
argument is correct, it neither changes the analysis nor
shifts the burden under the Act.

The Legislature chose in §

78-27-41 to place the burden upon the party

seeking to have

a non-party's negligence considered to join those

defendants

for the purpose of determining their respective proportions
of fault.

Section 78-27-41 simply and equitably assigns the

risk of inaction to the party who should bear that risk.
Other interrelated policy considerations lend further
support to this argument.
2.

Policy Considerations

Section 78-27-41 embodies the Legislature's considered
decision to place the burden upon a defendant

to ensure that

she does not become liable for more than her proportionate
-15-

share of plaintiff's damages. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-38
(1992).

There are compelling policy considerations behind

this choice.
Foremost is fairness to the plaintiff.

As amply

demonstrated at trial below, "it is unfair to saddle the
plaintiff with the burden of litigating liability issues of
a non-party or to try the absent tortfeasor in

absentia

under conditions which could not bind that person under
principles of res judicata

or collateral estoppel." National

Farmers Union Property & Casualty Co. v. Frackelton, 662
P.2d 1056, 1060 (Colo. 1983)(En Banc)(citation omitted).
The plaintiff, conversely, may be collaterally estopped to
deny issues litigated in the prior suit. See id.; see

also

Eurich v. Alkire, 597 P.2d 1207, 1209 (Kan. 1978) ("[A]ll
persons who are named as parties

and who are properly served

with summonses are bound by the percentage determination of
causal negligence." (emphasis added)).6

The Colorado

Supreme Court also noted, again as conclusively demonstrated
in this case, that "a comparison of the negligence of absent
tortfeasors may work to defeat any recovery by a deserving
plaintiff." Frackelton, 662 P.2d at 1060.
Another factor supporting the Legislature's decision to
place the burden upon the defendant to join other

This principle is fully consistent with Utah law that a
trial court may only make a legally binding adjudication
between parties actually joined in the action. E.g.,
Hilstley v. Ryder, 738 P.2d 1024 (Utah 1987).
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tortfeasors is that the defendant typically possesses
superior knowledge concerning the identity of responsible
parties.

This case is an excellent example of this

principle.

The facts supporting an action against the City

were uniquely within Nelson's knowledge and control.
Neither Nelson nor anyone else present at the scene the day
of the collision reported any obstruction of the stop sign.
This fact, in conjunction with Nelson's admittedly "vague"
recollection of an obstruction at her deposition, made it
difficult, if not impossible, for Turner's counsel to file
an action against any other party in good faith. See Utah R.
Civ. P. 11.
Further, as a matter of equity, "[i]t is preferable to
place the burden of finding and suing absent tortfeasors on
those who caused [the] plaintiff to suffer damages." Id.;
see also

Martinez v. First National Bank of Santa Fe, 755

P.2d 606, 609 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987)(Noting "nothing in the
record which would have precluded defendant from joining . .
. [the] third party defendant and thus proving his
negligence if, indeed, there was any to be proved").
Closely related to these considerations is the interest
of the Legislature in promoting judicial economy.

By

placing the burden of adding responsible parties upon the
party

with the greatest interest in having all parties•

liability adjudicated, the Legislature has attempted to
ensure that plaintiff's injuries will be redressed in a
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single action. See Kemp v. Murray, 680 P.2d 758 (Utah,
1984) ; Utah R. Civ. P. 19.
The Legislature's requirement that defendants
parties

be

to the action in order to have their negligence

considered is also consistent with the policy most often
relied upon by courts in allowing non-parties' negligence to
be apportioned:

the premise that a tortfeasor should not be

liable for more than her proportionate share of fault. See
Paul v. N.L. Industries, Inc., 623 P.2d 68 (Okla. 1981);
Pocatello Industrial Park Co. v. Steel West, Inc., 621 P.2d
399 (Idaho 1980); Brown v. Keill, 580 P.2d 867 (Kan. 1978).
The Utah Legislature has simply chosen a more equitable
means of achieving this goal than Oklahoma, Idaho and
Kansas.
Furthermore, the Oklahoma, Idaho and Kansas cases were
all decided at least five years prior to the passage of the
Act.

It is fair to assume that the Legislature was aware of

these cases and their reasoning, and that the Legislature
intentionally chose not to adopt their position when
drafting the Act.

Several sister states have considered

these cases and have also expressly declined to follow their
reasoning. See Mills v. Brown, 735 P.2d 603 (Ore. 1987);
Warmbrodt v. Blanchard, 692 P.2d 1282 (Nev. 1984); National
Farmers Union Property & Casualty Co. v. Frackelton, 662
P.2d 1056, 1060 (Colo. 1983)(En

Banc).

The Utah Legislature has chosen in § 78-27-41 to
allocate the burden of spreading liability proportionately
-18-

to the party seeking
considered

to have

under the Act.

the negligence

of

others

Compelling policy considerations

support the Legislature's decision*

The Court should honor

that decision,
3.

Statutory Scheme

The Act comprises a carefully considered and precisely
worded scheme by which the comparative fault of all
to an action can be assessed.

parties

The inclusion of § 78-27-41

is clear evidence of the Legislature's intent that only
parties to the action be considered.
The legislative intent as expressed in the statute is
the governing consideration when interpreting a statute. See
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake City, 575 P.2d 705, 706
(Utah 1978).

In order to ascertain legislative intent,

courts are not permitted to consider only a certain isolated
part or parts of an act but are required to consider and
construe the act in pari

materia.

See Brown v. Keill, 580

P.2d 867, 872 (Kan. 1978).
As noted, nothing in the first four sections of the Act
appears to preclude a court from apportioning fault to a
non-party to the action.

When those sections are read in

conjunction with § 78-27-41, however, the Act must be
interpreted to prohibit the allocation of negligence to a
defendant

unless that defendant

is joined as a

party.

The trial court erroneously relied exclusively upon
§ 78-27-38, without considering the language or effect of §
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78-27-41, or the Act's statutory scheme, in deciding to
allow the City's negligence to be considered:
It's my view that the purpose of No-Fault Act has to do
with assuring that no party will be responsible to pay
more than their appropriate share of the fault causing
the accident, and given that overview, it seems to me
that policy consideration behind the act, it seems to
me that in these circumstances it's a fair request that
Salt Lake City be considered on the apportionment
portion of the verdict for purposes of assessing all of
the fault that may have contributed to the cause of
this accident • . . .
(R. 358). By itself, § 78-27-38 arguably supports the
court's conclusion.

The court may not, however, consider

the Act piecemeal. See Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 777 P.2d
428 (Utah 1989); Brown v. Keill, 580 P.2d 867, 872 (Kan.
1978).
The plain language of § 78-27-41 mandates that a
defendant

be joined as a party

before her negligence can be

considered by the trier of fact.

The policy considerations

underlying the Act and the Legislature's statutory scheme
support this interpretation.
This Court is not required to accord the trial court's
interpretation of a statute any deference, and may review
the trial court's interpretation de novo.
751 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1988).

Asay v. Watkins,

The trial court focused upon an

isolated section of the Act, and in so doing failed properly
to construe the Act as written and intended by the
Legislature.

The trial court's erroneous application of the

Act was manifestly prejudicial to Turner, and should be
reversed.
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B.

THE TRIAL COURTS ADDITION OF THE CITY TO THE
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM THE DAY OF TRIAL WAS
ERRONEOUS AND PREJUDICIAL

Should the Court decide that non-parties' negligence
may be apportioned under the Act, the Court should, in the
interests of equity and justice, remand the case for a
retrial and give Turner and the City the opportunity to
litigate the case fully and fairly.7

Nelson's motion to

add the City less than a week before trial, and the trial
court's addition of the City the day of trial was unfair and
prejudicial to Turner, and constituted an abuse of the trial
court's discretion.
Utah courts have long required that amendments to the
pleadings or the addition of parties made shortly before, or
at, the time of trial be fair to the opposing party.
Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983).

See

This Court has

held, in fact, that such motions are to be construed so as
to further the interests of justice, and are to be subjected
to much stricter scrutiny when made at, or during, trial.
Gillman v. Hansen, 486 P.2d 1045 (Utah 1971).
In Girard, the Court affirmed the trial court's denial
of a motion to amend to add new causes of action the day of
trial.

The Court based its affirmance upon the plaintiff's

Because this is an issue of first impression in this State,
Julie would respectfully request, for reasons set forth in
this Proposition, that the Court's ruling be applied
prospectively and that she be granted a retrial based upon
prejudice caused by the timing of the addition of the City.
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inability to state an adequate reason for the untimeliness
of the motion, and upon the disadvantage ui i surprise to the
defendant, stating that "the interests of justice will best
be served by the court's denial of the motion to amend." Id.
at 248 {citing

Johnson v. Brinkerhoff, 57 P.2d 1132 (1936)).

Similarly, in Tripp v. Vaughn, 746 P.2d 795 (Utah Ct. App.
1987), the court of appeals affirmed t he ienidl of a motion
to add a third party defendant made two weeks before trial
where "inadequate reasons for the untimely motion were
presented . . . . " Id

if

^8

In Kelly v. Utah Power & Light, 746 P.2d 1189 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987), the court held that the proper standard t jr •*
trial judge ronsi 1en ny d motion to amend is "whether the
opposing side would be put to unavoidable prejudice by
having an issue adjudicated for which ho hdd not time to
prepare." Id. at 1190 (citing Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth,
664 P.2d 455 (Utah 1983)).

Nelson filed her motion less

than a week before trial

)hcs offered no explanation for

her failure to add Salt Lake City as a party

during

discovery,8 and offered no adequate reason fn the delay in

Except the conclusory allegation, without citation of
authority, that the City could not be added under the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act. Regardless of the accuracy of
Nelson's statement under Utah law, Nelson's choice, at her
peril,
see Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-41, not to join (or
attempt to join) the City should not be allowed to work to
Julie's prejudice. See Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth. 664 P.2d
455 (Utah 1983)(Adjudication of issue for which party had
insufficient time to prepare constituted unavoidable
prejudice).
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notifying the trial court and Turner of her intent to add
the City to the special verdict form.9
Nelson's delay, whether the result of a tactical
decision or a lack of diligence, should not have been
allowed to prejudice Turner and deny her any recovery for
her injuries.

The interests of justice would best have been

served by the trial court's denial of the motion to amend to
add the City six days before trial. Girard v. Appleby, 660
P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1983).

The trial court clearly abused

its discretion.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO PERMIT REBUTTAL TESTIMONY
WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR
The trial court compounded its error in adding the City

the day of trial by subsequently prohibiting Turner from
presenting witness Jim Nakling's ("Nakling") rebuttal
testimony.

Nakling would have directly controverted

Nelson's testimony that the stop sign was obstructed, and
would have nullified or minimized her assault against the

CI., for example, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-111.5 (1992 Cum.
Supp.), which requires that a party file notice within
ninety (90) days of the filing of the complaint of her
intent to have the negligence of non-parties considered.
The party must identify the non-party's name and last-known
address, or "the best identification of such nonparty
which
is possible under the circumstances, together with a brief
statement of the basis for believing such nonparty to be at
fault." Failure to designate the nonparty within the
specified time precludes consideration of the nonparty's
alleged negligence. Colorado thus expressly recognizes the
potential for abuse by a party "laying behind the log" until
discovery has concluded (or the statute of limitations has
run) and then seeking to add an "empty chair" to shift the
blame to at trial.
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newly-added "ghost" tortfeasor, the City.

Nakling's

testimony was clearly proper rebuttal testimony intended to
meet new evidence in the case, and Nelson would have
suffered no demonstrable prejudice from its introduction.
Rebuttal evidence is that which tends to refute, or to
so modify or explain as to nullify or minimize the effect
of, the opponent's evidence. Board of Education of South
Sanpete School District v. Barton, 617 P.2d 347 (Utah 1980).
Rebuttal is a term of art, denoting evidence introduced by a
plaintiff

to meet new facts brought out in his opponent's

case in chief. Morgan v. Commercial Union Assurance Cos.,
606 F.2d 554 (5th Cir. 1979)(emphasi s ori ginaJ ); see a 1so
Soliz v. Ammerman, 395 P.2d 25 (Utah 1964)(Rebuttal evidence
should be confined to proof which answers or explains an
adversary's evidence).

Rebuttal evidence is designed to

meet facts not raised prior to the defendant's case in
chief, not facts which could

have been raised, Id

*t 5ljli.

:;• Rodriguez v. Olin Corp., 780 F.2d 491 (5th Cir.
1986), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
district court's refusal in allow rebuUal testimony in
response to defendant's expert's testimony.

In its

decision, the court discussed the rules and considerations
governing the admission or denial of rebuttal testimony.
The court held that rebuttal evidence should be allowed
where "new" testimony is presented during defendant s rase
in ohiet

The court stated that
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Logic and fairness lead us to conclude that new
evidence for purposes of rebuttal does not mean "brand
new." Rather, evidence is new if, under all the facts
and circumstances, the court concludes that the
evidence was not fairly and adequately presented to the
trier of fact before the defendant's case in chief.
Id. at 496.

The court pointed out that a plaintiff only

bears the burden of proving a prima facie

case, and is not

required to "prove the negative" of defendant's facts or
theories:
This rule proceeds from the view that a plaintiff has
the right to adduce whatever evidence is necessary to
establish its prima facie case and is under no
obligation to anticipate and negate in its own case in
chief any facts or theories that may be raised on
defense.
Id.: accord,

Kaczmarek v. Allied Chemical Corp., 836 F.2d

1055 (7th Cir. 1987).

The court held that the defendant's

expert's "corrosion fatique entrapment" testimony was "new,"
that the plaintiff had no cause or duty to go forward in its
case in chief and negate that testimony, and that the
district court's exclusion of the plaintiff's proffered
rebuttal testimony was improper and prejudicial. Id.

The

court reversed and remanded the case.
Witness Nakling's proffered testimony was clearly
proper rebuttal evidence that should have been admitted by
the trial court. See Barton, 617 P.2d 347, 349 (Utah 1980).
It was offered to refute Nelson's testimony that the stop
sign was obstructed, and to controvert the testimony of
Nelson's expert, who testified that, due to the obstruction,
Nelson could not reasonably have been aware that she needed
to stop.

Nelson and her expert's testimony was
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unquestionably "new" evidence which Turner was under no
obligation to anticipate and negate in her case in chief.
Rodriguez, 780 F.2d at 496-

Moreover, it is undisputed that

the substance of Nakling's testimony had not adequately been
presented to the jury prior to Nelson's case in chief. See
id.; see also

Everett v. S.H. Parks & Associates, Inc., 697

F . 2 d 2 5 0 , 2 5 2 ( 81h C ir. 19 8 3) (p 1 a ii 11: i £ f ' s rebu11a 1 evidenc e
"was not truly relevant until [defendant] presented its
defense").

Turner was thus effectively prevented from

offering any evidence

that the sign was not obstructed.

The

trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting Nakling
from testifying.
Nelson's obstruction testimony was not the only "new"
bit of evidence faced by Turner at trial.

The presence of

t he C i t y a s a " gho s 1: "1" t o r t £ e a s o i:, ma de kn own t o Tu i n e i j ust
minutes

before

opening

statements,

evidence of monstrous dimensions.

constituted "new"
The entire thrust of

Nelson's case changed from contesting her own negligence to
proving the alleged negligence of Salt Lake City, without
the City present to respond to or defend those al legations.
Turner was required to respond not just to new evidence,
to new issues

raised against a new

but

party*

Moreover, the admission of Nakling's testimony *ou UJ
have caused no demonstrable prejudice to Nelson,

Turner's

counsel offered to continue the trial or to allow Nelson to
depose Nakling at: her convenience i n order to prepare crossexamination. See State v. Albretsen, 782 P.2d 515, 519 (Utah
-26-

1989)(Additions to the witness list should be permitted
where good cause is shown.

"[G]ood cause must certainly be

construed to include . . . evidentiary matters developed
during the presentation of the case of either party, matters
which require clarification or rebuttal by that party").
Nelson further could not have been prejudiced by the
nature of Nakling's testimony.

Nelson presented two

witnesses who testified that the sign was obstructed.
Nakling's testimony simply controverted Nelson's witnesses,
and clearly went to the weight, not the admissibility, of
the evidence.

The jury should have been permitted to hear

both sides of the story.
Under the facts and circumstances of the case, the
court's denial of Turner's rebuttal evidence was manifestly
unfair and patently prejudicial, and constituted a clear
abuse of discretion.

The court's ruling should be reversed,

and the case should be remanded for a new trial.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Turner respectfully requests
that the trial court's rulings be reversed, and that the
case be remanded for a new trial consistent with Utah Code
Ann. § 78-27-41 and the case law cited herein.
Respectfully submitted,
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